The structure of prejudice and its relation to party preferences in Belgium: Flanders and Wallonia compared by Meeusen, Cecil et al.
1 
 
 
 
The structure of prejudice and its relation to party 
preferences in Belgium: Flanders and Wallonia 
compared 
 
Cecil Meeusen, Joris Boonen & Ruth Dassonneville 
 
*** Accepted for publication in Psychologica Belgica *** 
 
Abstract 
We test two assumptions of the generalized prejudice literature. First, that the structure of generalized 
prejudice (i.e. how prejudices are interrelated) is dependent on the intergroup context. Second, that 
different types of prejudice have similar political consequences and run via the generalized prejudice 
component. We perform these tests in the two main regions of Belgium − Flanders and Wallonia − 
and investigate the influence of differences in the history of immigration, experience of the linguistic 
and autonomy conflict, and the separate party system and political discourse (i.e. the societal and 
intergroup context) on these premises. We make use of the Belgian Election Panel (BEP) data that 
included measures of prejudice toward multiple target groups (immigrants, Flemings, Walloons, 
homosexuals, and Jews) and voting propensities for the main political parties. Our results show that, 
regardless of the differences in intergroup experiences, the structure of prejudice is identical in 
Flanders and Wallonia. Flemings are, however, more tolerant toward homosexuals and immigrants 
than Walloons. The political context and the set of potential political outlets does play an important 
moderating role in the translation of prejudices to party preferences: While negative attitudes toward 
the other regional group seem to divide the electorate in Flanders, it does not affect voting intentions 
in Wallonia. Anti-immigrant prejudice is crucial in both regions, but affects voters in different ways 
at the right-side of the political spectrum. 
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1. Introduction 
Although prejudice is specific and directed toward totally different kinds of target groups such as 
immigrants, homosexuals, and Jews, there is a large consensus that all target-specific prejudices are 
strongly associated and share a common core labelled “generalized prejudice” (Allport, 1954; Bergh 
& Akrami, 2016). According to the individual-difference perspective this general tendency to devalue 
all kind of target groups has its origins in personality traits and cognitive abilities, making it an almost 
universal phenomenon (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Hodson & Dhont, 2015). 
The content of this generalized prejudice, however, is expected to vary between social contexts: 
“which outgroups become targets of prejudice and discrimination depends on the options a specific 
society offers” (Zick et al. 2008, p. 367). In other words, while every individual has a predisposition 
– some a strong one, others a weak one – to think in terms of “us versus them,” how these prejudices 
are structured and interconnected will be inherent to temporal and contextual constraints. This 
assumption is the first premise examined in this article. 
A second common assumption is that different types of prejudice have similar consequences (Zick 
et al., 2008). In that sense, observed target-specific consequences can actually be characteristic of a 
general prejudiced personality, but this goes often unnoticed. A typical example of this phenomenon 
is the relationship between anti-immigrant prejudice and extreme-right voting. This might be caused 
by a general devaluation of outgroups, rather than by feelings of prejudice toward this one specific 
outgroup (i.e. immigrants).   
In this article we evaluate these two premises for the Belgian case: (1) whether the structure of 
generalized prejudice is context-specific, and (2) whether what seem target-specific consequences are 
actually the result of one’s generalized prejudice predisposition. Belgium is a particularly interesting 
case in this regard as it consists of two main regions: Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking 
Wallonia (with bilingual Brussels as a smaller third “capital-region”). The two main regions share 
important traditions, national identity, and religion, but simultaneously have their own unique 
intergroup context (Billiet, Maddens, & Frognier, 2006). Moreover, the gradual evolution to more 
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institutional independence between the regions has reinforced a type of regional prejudice and 
stereotyping that is typical for the Belgian case (Klein, Licata, Van der Linden, Mercy, & Luminet, 
2012). If the first premise holds, these regional differences should be reflected in a different 
configuration of (generalized) prejudice. Therefore, our first goal is to investigate the structure of 
prejudice in Belgium and to compare this structure between Flanders and Wallonia (RQ 1). To this 
end, we examine the interrelations between prejudices toward four different target groups (the other 
regional group, immigrants, Jews, and homosexuals) in the first part of the article.  
Next, we address the second premise and hypothesize that the particular intergroup context in both 
regions not only defines how prejudice is structured, but also how prejudice translates into political 
preferences. We thus investigate how regional intergroup experiences with regard to target groups 
such as immigrants and the other regional group affect the translation of target-specific prejudices 
into party preferences in the two main regions of the country (RQ 2). We present both research 
questions in Figure 1 below. 
We aim to contribute to the literature on generalized prejudice in three ways. First, contrary to the 
dominant personality perspective, we propose a context-based approach to generalized prejudice by 
comparing the structure of prejudice in two different cultures. Second, including prejudice toward an 
atypical target group – the other regional group, i.e. Flemings or Walloons – can enhance our 
understanding of the applicability and boundary of the generalized prejudice concept and its 
implications for political preferences.1 While both are majority groups in their respective region, 
historical and contemporary political conflicts have activated feelings of threat and hostility toward 
each other (Klein et al., 2012). Third, studies on the political outcomes of target-specific prejudice 
disregard the fact that prejudices are highly correlated, missing potential spurious relations. 
                                                 
1 We refer to this type of context-specific prejudice as “atypical” because of the particular nature of the structure 
of the Belgian federation. The citizens we are studying live together in the same country, but apart in their 
separate language regions (leaving Brussels aside) (in contrast to settings where groups speaking different 
languages live together, e.g. Quebec). This language-based separation in two regions has led to what we believe 
is a very specific type of regional prejudice, with its particular stereotypes unique for the Belgian context. 
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Therefore, we explicitly explore the relation between party preferences and target-specific prejudice, 
while accounting for the common variance in these target-specific prejudices.  
 
FIGURE 1 
 
2. The structure of prejudice 
Different types of prejudice share a strong common component labeled “generalized prejudice” 
(Allport, 1954; Bergh & Akrami, 2016) or “a syndrome of group-focused enmity” (Zick et al., 2008). 
Previous research has mainly been directed at discovering the origins of this generalized prejudice 
component and identified personality traits and ideological factors such as right-wing 
authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) as crucial predictors (Ekehammar 
et al., 2004). If generalized prejudice is primarily person-based, it essentially means that this 
systematic tendency to devalue outgroups can be found within every person, in every society, and at 
any given time (Zick et al., 2008). Although many authors have confirmed the existence of a one-
dimensional generalized prejudice factor capturing prejudice toward a diversity of groups (e.g. 
Akrami, Ekehammar, & Bergh, 2011; Bierly, 1985; Zick et al., 2008), others stress that some types 
of prejudice are more similar than other types, resulting in subdimensions or clusters within 
generalized prejudice (e.g. Bratt, 2005; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Depending on group characteristics 
(e.g. target’s political objectives, intergroup status, or cultural distance) people can react differently 
to different sorts of groups, resulting in a multidimensional structure of prejudice (Crawford, 
Mallinas, & Furman, 2015). For example, Bratt (2005) found a multidimensional solution for ethnic 
prejudice in Norway where old immigrant groups formed one cluster and new immigrant groups 
another one. Nevertheless, these subdimensions of prejudice seem to be highly interrelated and a 
common generalized prejudice factor can still be distinguished (Beierlein, Kuntz, & Davidov, 2016). 
Applying these insights to the Belgian context, we expect to find a strong (one- or multidimensional) 
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generalized prejudice structure in both Flanders and Wallonia. This implies that the context-specific 
“regional prejudice” will be part of the generalized prejudice factor in both regions as well. 
H1: Particular prejudices summarize in a generalized prejudice factor in Flanders and in 
Wallonia 
The existence of a generalized prejudice factor, however, does not mean that each kind of target 
group automatically becomes part of this factor, nor that all types of prejudice are interlinked to the 
same extent (Meeusen & Kern, 2016). The structure also depends on the socially offered motivations 
to justify (e.g. perceived threat) or suppress (e.g. social norms) expressions of prejudice toward 
different target groups (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Zick et al., 2008). Particular prejudices that are 
subject to similar suppression and justification mechanisms will be more strongly connected. 
Consequently, opportunities in the social and intergroup context (i.e. the interaction between social 
groups, in a social, economic, political, and cultural environment) will define how prejudices are 
linked. Therefore, we expect that the structure of prejudice in Flanders and Wallonia will reflect the 
differences in the intergroup context of these regions, which we describe below (see Figure 1).  
Previous research has almost exclusively focused on the origins of generalized prejudice and not 
on the interpersonal and societal consequences of the structure of prejudice. The generalized prejudice 
idea assumes that if particular prejudices are highly correlated, they should have similar consequences 
that find their origin in a general prejudiced personality (Zick et al., 2008). This would imply that 
previously observed target-specific consequences such as the relation between anti-immigrant 
prejudice and political preferences for extreme-right parties or discriminatory behavior are 
characteristic of a broader and general process of outgroup hostility. Therefore, we argue that to get 
a clear picture of the relationship between prejudices and party preferences, the shared variance 
between particular prejudices, i.e. the common prejudice component, should be taken into account 
(for a similar approach see Akrami et al., 2011; Meeusen & Dhont, 2015). Furthermore, we expect 
the intergroup context of both regions and their separate party systems to moderate the relation 
between prejudice and party preferences (Figure 1).  
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We focus on prejudices toward four salient target groups, that each represent a particular prejudice 
type: Jews as a ethnoreligious minority group, homosexuals as a sexual minority group, immigrants 
as a common example of an ethnic outgroup, and inhabitants of the other regional group (Flemings 
or Walloons) as a context-specific group. We put specific emphasis on anti-immigrant and regional 
prejudice as these two types are idiosyncratic to the particular intergroup context in the two main 
regions and are expected to be drivers of political behavior. Whereas anti-immigrant prejudice is a 
well understood phenomenon and has often been linked to voting behavior (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 
2015), we argue that in a context of regionalism and an ongoing debate on power redistribution and 
interregional solidarity, prejudice toward inhabitants of the other region is a central attitude as well. 
We do not expect structural differences in the position of Jews and homosexuals in both regions 
(Eeckhout & Paternotte, 2011), nor do we expect these attitudes to play a key role in explaining party 
preferences (Boonen & Hooghe, 2013). These two target groups are therefore mainly included as a 
benchmark and allow for testing the idea of generalized prejudice. 
 
3. The intergroup context: Flanders versus Wallonia 
3.1 Regionalization: Linguistic and autonomy conflict  
The evolution toward more regional autonomy or regionalization in Belgium is a process of power 
conflicts, rooted in seemingly unbridgeable cultural and economic differences between the regions. 
To accommodate opposing demands of various regionalist movements, the Belgian state has become 
a double federation of three regions and two main language communities (Deschouwer, 2009): The 
three regions are Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels Capital; the two main language groups are Dutch 
(or Flemish)- and French-speakers.2 The issue of power redistribution was initially predominantly 
                                                 
2 Both structures overlap in Brussels, where both language communities live together. For reasons of simplicity, 
in this article we focus on the two main regions of Belgium only, i.e., Flanders and Wallonia. That way, we 
examine attitudes in two clearly opposing groups, that are not only different regions but also represent different 
language communities. The third language community is the German-speaking one. The community has the 
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focused on linguistic policies and culture-related competences (Deschouwer, 2009, 2013). In 
Flanders, threat perceptions are based on collective memories of the historical dominance of 
francophone elites and the related struggle for the protection of the Flemish culture (Billiet, Maddens, 
& Beerten, 2003; Klein et al., 2012). Among Francophones, feelings of threat stem from this explicit 
conflict for the preservation of the Dutch language, and from the current dominance of a self-aware, 
economically leading and unilingual Flanders (Hooghe, 2004). A process of subsequent constitutional 
reforms from the 1960s onwards has legally formalized and confirmed the pre-existing cultural and 
linguistic differences in a new, regionalized political structure.  
At its origin, the Walloon regionalist movement focused on obtaining economic autonomy as a 
reaction to the Flemish region’s dominance of the Belgian economy (Swenden & Jans, 2006). Over 
the past decennia – but particularly from 2007 onwards – the focus of debates between both regions 
has shifted even more to demands for financial and political autonomy. The Flemish demand for a 
regional organization of the Belgian social security system, for example, is currently the most visible 
issue in the power struggle between the regions (Béland & Lecours, 2005; Deschouwer, 2013). This 
Flemish discourse contrasts with the preference for more interregional solidarity and a durable federal 
state in Wallonia (Deschouwer, 2013).  
The linguistic and cultural differences between Walloons and Flemings, in combination with an 
ongoing debate on economic independence versus solidarity have provided breeding ground for a 
distinct type of “regional prejudice,” unique for the Belgian context. Typical stereotypes connected 
to these conflicts are Flemings as being “intolerant,” “selfish,” and “nationalist”; and Walloons as 
being “lazy” and “exploiting the social welfare system,” subsided by the “hard-working” Flemings 
(Klein et al., 2012).  
 
                                                 
same responsibilities as the French- and Dutch-speaking community, but is very small and does not play a key 
role in Belgian intergroup relations (Deschouwer, 2009). Therefore, this community was not included in the 
study. 
8 
 
 
 
3.2 Experiences with immigration 
As other Western European countries, Belgium has a long tradition of immigration. In the aftermath 
of the Second World War, guest workers – initially from Italy and later from North-African countries 
and Turkey – were attracted to fill labor shortages. Most non-European immigrants nowadays have 
Moroccan ancestry (OECD, 2015), which coincides with the public perception about the origins of 
immigrants (Spruyt, Van der Noll, & Vandenbossche, 2016). Belgians, however, structurally 
overestimate the percentage of immigrants in the country, enhancing feelings of prejudice toward the 
group (Hooghe & De Vroome, 2015). 
Interestingly, in Flanders and Wallonia immigration is experienced and evaluated differently. 
These differences seem to reflect contextual characteristics in the region, rather than the 
characteristics of its inhabitants (Billiet et al., 2006). Wallonia has a longer history of immigration, 
making Walloons more open toward diversity and the inclusion of newcomers. Walloon integration 
policies are focused on anti-exclusionism (Martiniello, 2003). However, a deteriorating Walloon 
economy has activated feelings of competition and threat toward immigration. The situation is 
somewhat different in Flanders, where a historical struggle for the maintenance of the cultural heritage 
has generated feelings of cultural threat towards immigrants as well, resulting in restrictive attitudes 
toward immigration (Billiet et al., 2006). 
In Flanders, these feelings of threat are crystalized in the anti-immigrant discourse of a strong 
extreme-right party, keeping the issue constantly on the political agenda. Right-wing extremism in 
Flanders also has a strong Flemish identity component and claims the existence of irreconcilable 
cultural differences between Flemings and Walloons. As such, Flemish nationalism urges thinking in 
terms of “us” (Flemings) versus “them” (the culturally and economically threatening Walloons and 
immigrants) and thus combines prejudice toward both target groups in one overarching political 
ideology (De Wever, 2011). In Wallonia, by contrast, right-wing extremism has never had a real 
viable political outlet and is not linked to a strong regional identity either (Billiet et al., 2003) (see 
section 3.3).  
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In sum, we expect prejudice toward inhabitants of the other region to be more strongly linked to 
anti-immigrant prejudice in Flanders compared with Wallonia, reflecting its particular intergroup 
context: In Flanders both target groups are susceptible to similar justification mechanisms as feelings 
of cultural and economic threat. Moreover, the presence of a right-wing and Flemish nationalist 
discourse priming Flemish ingroup identity and targeting Walloons and immigrants simultaneously, 
further enhances the association between the types. These mechanisms are only marginal or not even 
present at all in Wallonia.  
H2: Prejudice toward immigrants and prejudice toward the other regional group are more 
strongly associated in Flanders compared with Wallonia.  
 
3.3 Political cleavages and separate party systems  
The process of regionalization did not only have consequences for power redistribution, but has also 
affected the structure of the party landscape, which has split along linguistic lines (De Winter, 
Swyngedouw, & Dumont, 2006). The result is an entirely separated electoral competition: In Flanders 
only Flemish parties compete and in Wallonia only Francophone parties present lists. This has far-
reaching implications for the structure of the political debate and the discourse of political parties, 
with both party systems focusing on their own regional electorate. 
At the level of parties’ discourses there are important differences in the salience of regionalism in 
both regions. In Flanders, the demand for more regional autonomy is one of the main political 
cleavages clearly dividing the political landscape. The most obvious proponents are the rightist 
Flemish nationalist N-VA (anno 2016 the largest political formation in Flanders) and the extreme-
right Vlaams Belang. Explicit opponents of further regionalization are the socialist Sp.a and the Green 
party Groen at the left of the political spectrum (Deschouwer et al., 2015). In Wallonia, regional 
autonomy is far less of a divisive political issue, as all major parties are oriented on the same side in 
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this debate, namely the preference for Belgium as a federal state (Deschouwer & Reuchamps, 2013).3 
In contrast to the Flemish extreme-right intensely striving for an independent Flanders, the marginal 
Francophone extreme-right Démocratie Nationale (formerly Front National) promotes a Belgian 
Union. The clear mismatch between the territorial demands by a number of major Flemish parties and 
the reticence of the francophone parties in this respect has led to numerous political crises over the 
past years (Deschouwer & Reuchamps, 2013).4   
Studies focusing on this issue have mostly highlighted the link between preferences for (more) 
regional autonomy and party preferences (Deschouwer et al., 2015), but have not yet focused on the 
possible underlying negative attitudes toward the inhabitants of the other region. This target-specific 
regional prejudice is therefore the main focus in our analysis, and can contribute to our understanding 
of voting intentions in both regions. 
As is the case for regionalization, the political issue of immigration has also affected the political 
debate and party competition in both regions in a different way. In Flanders, anti-immigrant attitudes 
and the related votes for the extreme-rightist Vlaams Belang have extensively been studied (Billiet & 
De Witte, 2008). This populist Flemish radical right party originated from a dissident party of the 
Flemish nationalist Volksunie in 1978 and its main focus on Flemish independence quickly turned 
into a populist discourse on immigration (Deschouwer, 2009). The party managed to become the 
largest party in the 2004 elections for the Flemish Parliament. Although the party also has an explicit 
discourse striving for Flemish independence and focuses on other issues related to crime and 
authority, their electorate has based its decision mainly on issues related to immigration (Walgrave 
& De Swert, 2004). In Wallonia, by contrast, a strong extreme right-wing party has never surged. 
                                                 
3 FDF (Fédéralistes Démocrates Francophones), currently (since November 2015) DéFi (Démocrate Fédéraliste 
Indépendant) is an outlier in this respect. FDF/DéFi is a party focusing mainly on the French language and on 
the rights of Francophones in the Brussels region. The party can thus be labeled “French regionalist,” but it 
should not be seen as the regionalist francophone counterpart of N-VA: FDF/Défi does not strive for 
independence for Brussels or the Francophone part of the country. 
4 There are no relevant political parties advocating for Walloon regionalism. Note, however, that Walloon 
regionalism is traditionally leftist (Billiet, Jaspaert & Swyngedouw, 2012), which is another interesting 
asymmetry between regionalism in both parts of the country.  
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Furthermore, previous research has indicated that this is not due to a difference at the demand-side, 
as negative attitudes toward immigrants are equally prevalent in Wallonia (Coffé, 2005). The 
explanation, hence, seems to lie in the supply-side, as only in Flanders the extreme-right has a well-
organized political party with a strong leadership. The Walloon extreme-right party has been visible 
over the past decades, but thus far has not managed to attract a significant share of voters, making it 
a marginal electoral player. 
In sum, in Flanders feelings of anti-immigrant and anti-Walloon prejudice are explicitly politically 
mobilized while this is not the case in the Walloon region. We therefore expect anti-immigrant and 
regional prejudice to be important predictors for party preferences in Flanders; in Wallonia, we expect 
both types of prejudice to be less relevant for the vote choice. Further, we expect the relationships 
between the prejudice types and party preferences to remain stable when taking into account the 
generalized prejudice factor, as the political discourse is explicitly framed in terms of the target-group 
(anti-immigrant, anti-Walloon) and not so much in terms of “us versus anyone else.” 
H3 and H4: Prejudice toward immigrants and prejudice toward the other regional group are 
related to party preferences in Flanders (H3), and this relation remains stable when controlling for 
generalized prejudice (H4). 
H5: Prejudice toward immigrants and prejudice toward the other regional group are no important 
predictors of party preferences in Wallonia. 
 
4. Data and methods 
4.1 Participants  
The survey data stem from the Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014, a panel-study on the electoral 
behavior and public opinion of the Belgian population (Dassonneville, Falk Pedersen, Grieb, & 
Hooghe, 2014). Participants are 1,542 Belgian residents 18-year and older (N = 848 Flemings and N 
12 
 
 
 
= 694 Walloons). Demographically, the Flemish and Walloon sample are comparable with regard to 
gender (51.4% men in Flemish sample and 50.6% in Walloon sample), education (12.8% higher 
educated in Flemish sample and 12.3% in Walloon sample), age (Mean of 55.17 years in Flemish 
sample and 52.24 in Walloon sample), and religion (11% practicing Catholics in Flanders and 9.7% 
in Wallonia). Unfortunately, the study does not include information on the ethnic background or 
sexual orientation of respondents. In both regions, women as well as older voters were somewhat 
underrepresented in the survey compared to the general population. To correct for the 
underrepresentation of these groups, a sociodemographic weight was applied. This weight ranged 
between 0.92 and 1.48.  
 
4.2 Procedure and materials 
In 2009, a geographically stratified sample of 4,863 voters from the regions of Flanders and Wallonia 
were selected and contacted for participation. Due to budgetary constraints the Brussels region was 
not included in the sampling frame, implying that the two main regions of Belgium are focused upon. 
In 2014, 4,488 citizens of the original 2009 sample were contacted again to participate in a paper-
based pre- and post-electoral survey in the context of the 2014 elections in Belgium. In this article, 
we rely on information of the 2014 pre-electoral survey, as this survey-wave included measures on 
attitudes toward different target groups. This wave consists of 1,542 completed (and valid) surveys 
with a response rate of 37.6% among the Flemish and 31.1% among the Walloon respondents. For 
more information on sampling and representativeness, we refer to the technical report (Dassonneville 
et al., 2014). 
 
4.3 Measures 
To measure different types of prejudice we rely on a range of feeling thermometer scales. 
Respondents were asked to rate immigrants, homosexuals, Jews, and inhabitants of the other region 
13 
 
 
 
(Flemings/Walloons) on a scale from 0 = very negative feeling to 100 = very positive feeling. 
Admittedly, thermometer ratings capture affective prejudice rather than cognitive forms of prejudice 
such as beliefs and stereotypes (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005), but they provide a neutral, evaluative, and 
content-free measurement making comparisons between groups possible (Bobo & Zubrinsky, 1996).  
To investigate the target-specific consequences of prejudice and the impact on party preferences 
more specifically, we make use of propensity-to-vote (PTV) measures. These measures have been 
introduced in electoral research by van der Eijk and his colleagues (2006) and ask voters to indicate 
on a scale from 0 to 10 their probability to ever vote for each of the parties in the party system. Since 
their introduction, a large and growing number of studies have relied on such measures to investigate 
voting intentions, especially in the context of multiparty systems in Europe (De Angelis & Garzia, 
2013). The PTV measures are aimed to directly capture respondents’ utility of voting for different 
parties. Van der Eijk and colleagues (2006) argue that PTVs should be preferred over traditional 
categorical vote intention or vote choice measures. The reason is that, particularly in multiparty 
systems such as Belgium, there are usually too few respondents intending to vote for the smaller 
parties. Particularly when focusing on smaller extreme-right parties, the voters of which are generally 
underrepresented in election surveys (Swyngedouw, 2001), relying on PTV measures allows for a 
more reliable analysis of what explains the probability of voting for these parties. 
As PTV measures are based on hypothetical questions of ever voting for a party, they are also 
criticized for having a low level of construct validity. It is argued that voters are not actively and 
consciously comparing their propensities of voting for different parties. Previous research has 
thoroughly examined the validity of PTV measures (van der Eijk et al., 2006). First, this work has 
shown that a large majority of voters effectively votes for the party they give the highest PTV to. 
Second, using information on voters’ second choice – measured by means of a vote intention question 
– these authors have shown that for most voters their second choice is effectively the party receiving 
the second highest propensity value as well. Finally, analyses of the vote choice with, on the one hand 
a categorical dependent variable, and on the other hand a PTV-measures as the dependent variable, 
14 
 
 
 
tend to lead to the same substantive conclusions about the determinants of party preferences (van der 
Eijk et al., 2006).  
For the data at hand we validated the PTV-measures, and found that 94% of the voters in the 2014 
pre-electoral survey intended to vote for the party they gave the highest propensity to. We thus feel 
confident that these measures are valid, and allow for a thorough analysis of predictors of the vote 
choice. For the analyses, we consider all Flemish parties included in the questionnaire.5 For the 
Walloon parties, unfortunately the questionnaire did not include an item of the new party Parti 
Populaire6, all other Walloon parties were included.7 It is important to point out that the questionnaire 
still included an item referring to the Front National (FN) and not to the many splinter-parties that, 
at the time of the election, had succeeded this extreme-right party. We assume, however, that 
supporters of any of its successor parties still indicated a higher PTV score for the FN-item. We think 
this is a valid assumption, as the PTV measures are not gauging the preference of voting in one 
specific election at stake.  
Some typical control variables for research on party preferences in Belgium were included 
(Deschouwer et al., 2015): age (in years), education (six-point scale, 1 = no degree, 6 = university 
degree), gender, socio-economic status (four categories: self-employed, non-manual workers, manual 
workers, and non-active), and religious practice (four categories: non-religious, Catholic non-
practicing, Catholic practicing, and Other). Note that we do not control for other political attitudes or 
opinions that are likely to correlate with the PTV measures, such as voters’ left-right position, because 
we do not consider these attitudes to be causally prior to intergroup attitudes.  
                                                 
5 The far-left PVDA, the Green Groen, the socialist Sp.a, the Christian-democrats CD&V, the Liberal Open 
VLD, the Flemish-Nationalist N-VA, and the extreme-right Vlaams Belang. The very small party LDD 
(Libertarian, Direct and Democratic) was not included. LDD was electorally successfully for a short period but 
was clearly losing in the polls. In the context of the 2014 elections, LDD presented electoral lists in only one 
province (West-Flanders). 
6 In 2014, the party obtained 4.9% of the votes in the Walloon parliament. Its non-inclusion in the questionnaire 
and in the analyses is therefore a limitation of the current study. 
7 The far-left PTB, the Green Ecolo, the socialist PS, the Christian-democrats CDH, the Liberal MR, the French 
Regionalist FDF, and the extreme-right Front National. 
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4.4  Analytic plan 
To evaluate whether the structure of prejudice is equivalent in Flanders and Wallonia (RQ 1), we 
perform multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (Byrne, 2012). We start by fitting a multigroup 
baseline model with freely estimated parameters to analyze whether generalized prejudice has the 
same dimensional factor structure in both groups, i.e. Configural Invariance. Second, we assess 
whether the pair-wise factor loadings of the latent construct (the relationship between the target-
specific prejudices and the generalized prejudice component) are equal between the groups, i.e. 
whether there is Metric Invariance (or Weak Factorial Invariance). Third, we evaluate whether the 
paired intercepts of the scale items (here mean levels of the target-specific prejudices) are equal across 
both groups, i.e. whether there is also Scalar Invariance (or Strong Factorial Invariance). For 
generalized prejudice to have an equivalent meaning in both regions, at least Metric Invariance must 
be confirmed. Following model fit indices are used to compare the nested models: the Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) which is preferably below .08, the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) preferably above .95, the Chi-square difference test, and the 
difference between CFI values (preferably lower or equal to .01) (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). However, following Little’s advice (2013), when comparing the nested models we 
evaluate the statistical significance (in terms of model fit) always in combination with its 
interpretability.  
After establishing the structure of prejudice, we evaluate how the target-specific prejudices are 
related to voting propensities in both regions (RQ 2). Because we have multiple dependent variables 
– PTVs for each party − we perform a multivariate regression analysis. This way, we reduce type 1 
error by estimating all dependent variables in the same model and we take the associations between 
the voting propensities into account. The latter is important, as PTVs for parties on the left/right will 
be correlated. Each time, we present a model with and without controls for the generalized prejudice 
component. To account for missing data and non-normality of certain variables, parameters were 
estimated with a Full Information Robust Maximum Likelihood Estimator in Mplus 7.3. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Structure of prejudice in Flanders and Wallonia 
Before proceeding with the evaluation of the structure of prejudice, we first look at some descriptive 
results. Figure 2 shows that Walloons and Flemings agree on the hierarchy in positive feelings toward 
the four target groups: Homosexuals and the other regional group are liked most, followed by the 
Jews. Immigrants are disliked most. This hierarchy seems to follow the cultural distance logic: The 
higher the culturally visible differences with the Belgian majority group, the lower the positive 
feelings (Hagendoorn, 1995). While Walloons are somewhat more positive toward the Flemings 
compared to the homosexuals (p = .04), Flemings rate homosexuals more positively compared to the 
Walloons (p < .001). Despite the similarity in relative distance, Flemings and Walloons seem to differ 
in their absolute levels of tolerance. Flemings are more positive toward immigrants (p = .003, Cohen’s 
d = .168) and homosexuals (p < .001, Cohen’s d = .251) compared with Walloons. Both groups are 
equally positive toward each other (p = .787) and the Jews (p = .128). These differences in target-
specific feelings between Flemings and Walloons remain stable when controlling for education level, 
SES, gender and age.  
 
FIGURE 2 
 
All target-specific ratings are positively correlated (Table 1), suggesting a common denominator 
of “generalized prejudice.” The size of the correlations, however, differs between pairs of prejudices 
and between the two regional groups. The correlation between feelings toward immigrants and the 
other regional group is significantly higher (p < .001) in Flanders than in Wallonia. As could be 
expected based on the contextualization of the prejudices, Flemings are indeed more consistent in 
their evaluation of immigrants and the other regional group compared to Walloons. The relationship 
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between feelings toward Jews and homosexuals is stronger in Wallonia than in Flanders (p < .001). 
Feelings toward homosexuals and immigrants are least correlated in both regions. These differences 
in size of the correlations remain significant even when controlling for sociodemographic 
characteristics (i.e., age, education, gender, SES, and religion).  
 
TABLE 1 
 
We now formally evaluate the existence of a generalized prejudice structure in Belgium and 
compare the equivalence of the factor structure in Flanders and Wallonia. We start by estimating a 
latent generalized prejudice (GP) factor for the whole Belgian sample (Model 1a in Appendix A). The 
four target-specific prejudices load strongly on the GP factor (loadings between .535 and .802), but 
modification indices showed that including an error correlation between feelings toward immigrants 
and the other regional group (r = .202) would significantly improve the fit of the model. Next to a 
mutual overlap between all prejudice indicators captured by the GP factor, feelings toward 
immigrants and the other regional group have even more in common compared with the other target 
groups. The model including the error correlation has good fit with the data (Model 1b, Χ² = 3.135, 
df = 1, RMSEA = .039, CFI = .997, TLI = .983) and confirms the existence of a one-dimensional GP 
factor in Belgium (Figure 3).8   
Next, we establish a well-fitting baseline model for each region separately (Model 2a to 3b) (Byrne 
2012). In Flanders and Wallonia there is considerable overlap between the four target-specific 
prejudices with an additional error correlation between feelings toward immigrants and 
                                                 
8 We also fitted a higher-order two-factor model with prejudices toward immigrants and the other regional group 
loading on the first factor and prejudices toward homosexuals and Jews on the second factor, and a second-
order generalized prejudice factor. This model had good fit for the full Belgian sample (X² = 8.060, df = 3, 
RMSEA = .035, CFI = .993, TLI = .986), but in the multiple-group design identification problems made this 
model too complex and uninterpretable. The results do point in the direction of a multidimensional solution to 
the structure of prejudice, which is further discussed in the Discussion. 
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Flemings/Walloons. These two models represent the hypothesized multigroup model under test. In a 
first step, both baseline models are estimated in one model to test whether the number of factors and 
factor-loading patterns are the same across the regions. This step of Configural Invariance was 
confirmed (Model 4, X² = 5.977, df = 2, RMSEA = .053, CFI = .995, TLI = .969): The same one-
dimensional factor pattern of GP holds across Flanders and Wallonia (Figure 3). Importantly, this 
does not mean that the factor structure is identical in both groups. To this end, we have to specify 
parameter constraints on the pairwise factor loadings, error correlations, and intercepts.  
In a second step, we constrained the factor loadings per prejudice type to be equal across groups 
(Model 5). The comparison of the chi-square, the CFI, and the other fit indices between this model 
and the configural equivalence model showed that the factor loadings are identical between the 
groups, hence confirming Metric Invariance.9 In a third step, the error correlation between feelings 
toward immigrants and the other regional group was set to be equal in the two groups (Model 6). 
Model fit did not worsen which indicates that the error correlation is equivalent among Flemings and 
Walloons. Finally, also the intercepts per prejudice type were constrained to be equal across groups 
(Scalar Invariance) (Model 7a). Because restricting all four intercepts significantly deteriorated model 
fit, we freed the intercept of feelings toward homosexuals (Model 7b) and feelings toward immigrants 
(Model 7c): Flemings are more positive toward homosexuals and immigrants compared with 
Walloons. The model fit of this final model was good (X² = 23.659, df = 7, RMSEA = .058, CFI = 
.978, TLI = .963). Based on this partial scalar factorial invariance model, latent means of the GP 
factor can be compared: The levels of GP are not significantly different in Flanders and Wallonia (p 
= .237).   
                                                 
9 In terms of statistical significance, the metric invariance model did not meet the stringent criteria of p > .05 
for the chi-square difference and ∆ < .01 for the difference in CFI values. However, because the model fit 
differences and the modification indices were only small, we decided to keep the interpretable and parsimonious 
full metric invariance model. Freeing the factor loading of the item with the highest modification index would 
have resulted in freeing “positive feelings toward the other regional group”: The factor loading was slightly 
higher in the Flemish sample than in the Walloon sample. This means that for the Flemings attitudes toward the 
Walloons are more important in defining their generalized prejudice disposition, than attitudes toward the 
Flemings are decisive for the Walloons.  
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In sum, the analyses show that even though Walloons and Flemings have equal levels of 
generalized prejudice, they hold different levels of prejudice toward specific target groups: While 
Jews and the other regional group are equally liked, Flemings are more positive toward immigrants 
and homosexuals than Walloons. Nevertheless, feelings toward the four target groups can be 
summarized as one latent generalized prejudice factor and this factor structure is identical in Flanders 
and Wallonia. 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
5.2 Prejudice and party preference in Flanders and Wallonia 
In a next step, we examine the target-specific political consequence of prejudice in the two main 
regions of Belgium by connecting them to party preferences. Before doing so, we offer some 
descriptives of the dependent variables, the PTV measures for different parties. As evident from 
Figure 4, Walloon respondents indicate that they have the highest PTV for the Liberal and Socialist 
party. Flemish respondents, by contrast, are mostly attracted by the Christian-Democrats and the 
Flemish-nationalist party. In both regions, citizens are least likely to vote for the far-left and extreme-
right parties (and the regionalist party in Wallonia). 
 
FIGURE 4 
 
For analyzing the relation between PTVs and feelings toward immigrants on the one hand and the 
other regional group on the other hand, we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate a model with one 
target-specific thermometer rating as the independent and the PTVs as the dependent variables. 
Second, we estimate the same model but control for the generalized prejudice component, i.e. the 
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variance that the four prejudice types have in common. The generalized prejudice component was 
included as a latent factor of all four target-specific ratings. This way, we correct for the potential 
spurious effect that target-specific relations are actually due to a general tendency to dislike any kind 
of group, no matter the characteristics of the target. If the target-specific effect remains significant 
when the generalized component is taken into account, this means that the relationship between 
prejudice and party preferences is indeed target-specific and not solely due to a general prejudiced 
personality. The effect sizes of the relation between PTVs and the target-specific ratings, controlled 
for the generalized component are presented in Figure 5. The coefficients for the full models, 
including all control variables can be found in Appendix B.  
In Flanders, the immigrant ratings are significantly related to PTVs across all parties. Except for 
the far-left, liberal, and socialist party, these relationships remain significant when controlling for the 
generalized component, meaning that the observed relation is not driven by a generalized tendency 
to (dis)like outgroups, but by the immigrant component in the prejudice type. Flemish respondents 
with negative feelings toward immigrants are more likely to ever vote for the extreme-right party and 
the Flemish-nationalist party, but the effect of the latter (β = .186) is only half the size of the former 
(β = .368). On the other side of the political spectrum, the Green party attracts respondents with less 
negative feelings toward immigrants (β = −.253). A small negative effect also remains for the 
Christian-democrats (β = −.152).  
Initially, feelings toward the other regional group (here Walloons) are related to the PTV for all 
Flemish parties. However, when controlling for the generalized component, the association 
disappears for the far-left, green, liberal, and extreme-right party: Specific feelings toward the 
Walloons do not predict the PTV for these parties. Nevertheless, the likelihood to vote for the 
socialists and Christian-democrats is negatively related to the target-specific component of Walloon 
prejudice (β = −.191 and β = −.183 respectively). As predicted, finally, Flemish respondents with 
negative feelings toward the Walloons are more likely to vote for the Flemish-nationalist party (β = 
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.230). Surprisingly, however, while a Flemish identity is at the core of extreme-right in Flanders, anti-
Walloon attitudes are not related to the PTV of this party once the GP component is accounted for. 
In Wallonia we get a slightly different picture. While anti-immigrant feelings are significantly and 
strongly related to voting propensities once the generalized component is accounted for, this is not 
the case for negative feelings toward the other regional group (here Flemings). Walloon respondents 
with negative feelings toward immigrants have, as hypothesized, a higher PTV for the extreme-right 
(β = .387), but also a higher PTV for the liberals (β = .180). All other parties attract Walloons with a 
more positive attitude toward immigrants (β = −.157, β = −.320, β = −.330 and β = −.189, for the far-
left, greens, socialists and Christian-democrats respectively). Regarding feelings toward the 
Flemings, we can be brief: There is almost no relationship with the propensity to vote for any Walloon 
party, except for the extreme-right, which attracts Walloon voters with a positive attitude toward 
Flemings (β = −.179), reflected by its Belgian nationalist focus. Prejudice is not a decisive motivation 
to vote for the regionalist party in Wallonia.   
The generalized prejudice component is only marginally related to voting propensities. There are 
some indications that generalized prejudiced respondents are less likely to ever vote for the green and 
socialist parties and have a higher propensity to vote for extreme-right. These relationships disappear, 
however, when combined with the anti-immigrant rating. From this, we can conclude that voting 
propensities are mainly predicted by target-specific anti-immigrant feelings in both Wallonia and 
Flanders and that feelings toward the regional group are only relevant in Flanders, pointing to an 
asymmetrical translation of the structure of prejudice in voting propensities.10    
Finally, the relationships with the control variables follow the patterns that are often observed in 
similar studies on Belgian voters: The higher educated turn to the green and liberal party, while the 
lower educated have a higher PTV for extreme-right (and far-left in Flanders). Christian-democrats 
                                                 
10 We additionally tested models that correct for the tendency to answer with a high propensity to vote for each 
party. Although the effect sizes became smaller, the conclusions remained the same. Results are in Appendix 
C. 
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attract religious voters and liberals the self-employed. Younger respondent are more likely to ever 
vote for extreme-right and the far-left than older respondents.  
 
FIGURE 5 
 
6. Discussion 
We now return to the two central topics of this article – the structure of prejudice in Flanders and 
Wallonia, and its relation to party preferences – and summarize the main conclusions. First, with 
regard to the configuration of generalized prejudice, the regional intergroup context is not a key factor. 
This is shown by our first set of analyses, in which we demonstrate that a one-dimensional generalized 
prejudice factor indeed exists in Flanders and Wallonia (confirming H1), but that contrary to our 
expectation (H2), this factor has an identical structure in both regions. Importantly, prejudice toward 
the other regional group – an atypical context-specific prejudice type – is also part of the central 
structure of this construct and thus not an exceptional prejudice phenomenon. The fact that 
generalized prejudice is similarly structured in both regions does, however, not imply that Flemings 
and Walloons are equally prejudiced toward the target groups. While Flemings are often portrayed as 
intolerant and selfish (Klein et al., 2012), they have more positive attitudes toward immigrants and 
homosexuals than their Francophone compatriots. While generally attitudes toward homosexuals, 
Jews, and the other regional group were relatively positive, prejudice toward immigrants remains a 
key issue in Belgian intergroup relations.  
An important qualification needs to be made. Next to this mutual overlap in all target-specific 
prejudice indicators, there is an additional association between prejudice toward immigrants and the 
inhabitants of the other regional group (Flemings or Walloons) in both regions. One explanation for 
this strong target-specific connection is that prejudice toward both groups has its origins in similar 
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justification mechanisms such as cultural and economic threat (Crandall & Eshleman 2003). In 
Flanders, contrary to what holds in Wallonia, both the struggle for more regional autonomy and a 
more stringent attitude toward immigrants are associated with right-wing politics. Therefore, we 
expected to find a stronger association between the two prejudice types in Flanders than what holds 
for Walloon respondents. While the error correlation was indeed somewhat more outspoken in 
Flanders, the difference was not significant. As a result, we found no confirmation for the 
hypothesized stronger link between anti-immigrant and anti-Walloon prejudice in Flanders (H2).  
Further, while we found a one-dimensional solution for the structure of prejudice with this 
particular set of target groups in Belgium in this study, this does not mean that a multidimensional 
structure can be excluded. As was discussed, some authors find stronger relations between some target 
groups, representing subdimensions of prejudice (e.g. Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Here, we included 
only four target-groups, a decision that could have influenced the likelihood of finding a one-
dimensional solution. Therefore, future research on the structure of prejudice should try to incorporate 
as many outgroups as possible. Nevertheless, we are convinced that regardless the number of 
subdimensions, a higher-order generalized prejudice dimension will always appear because this 
tendency to think in terms of “us versus them” is said to be present in every individual (although in 
different gradients) (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950).  
A second main conclusion is that there is a clear target-specific link between feelings toward 
immigrants and the regional outgroup, and intended political behavior. Interestingly, for anti-
immigrant prejudice this link remains present even when we control for the generalized prejudice 
factor, suggesting that the relation between the structure of prejudice and party preferences is target-
specific rather than generalizable across target groups (confirming H4). This is an important finding, 
as it contradicts the generalized prejudice idea, where it is claimed that all prejudice types should 
have similar consequences that run via the common prejudice component (Zick et al., 2008). The 
relation between regional prejudice and some PTVs disappeared when controlling for the GP 
component. Clearly, anti-immigrant prejudice matters more for voting intentions than attitudes 
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toward Walloons and Flemings. But again, the intergroup context and the range of potential political 
outlets matters in this respect, as we found some interesting differences between this connection in 
Flanders and Wallonia. 
Not surprisingly, we found that a preference for extreme-right parties is related to anti-immigrant 
attitudes. More remarkable is how the observed link between the target-specific prejudice types and 
the PTVs differs in both party systems. In Flanders, it seems that voters with a prejudice toward 
immigrants and toward the other regional group find their way to the Flemish nationalist party (N-
VA). This rightist government party indeed pursues a rather firm policy toward immigrants, but its 
main goal remains realizing Flemish independence. In that sense, the significant link between 
negative feelings toward Walloons and a PTV for the N-VA is not surprising. What is somewhat 
remarkable is that PTVs for the N-VA are also correlated with prejudice toward immigrants. It seems 
that the N-VA serves as a “democratic alternative” for voters with anti-immigrant attitudes who do 
not have the intention to vote for the less socially acceptable extreme-right party Vlaams Belang. The 
explicit anti-immigrant discourse of this party and its racist reputation might activate a social norm 
against prejudice in the voter’s mind, making them less likely to express anti-minority political 
choices as they believe this vote is socially unacceptable (Blinder, Ford, & Ivarsflaten, 2013). 
Therefore, voters might refrain from voting for the extreme-right party and choose a more socially 
acceptable option instead: the Flemish-nationalist party. It must be remembered, however, that the 
effect size of the relationship between anti-immigrant prejudice and voting for the Flemish nationalist 
party was only half the size of the effect size of the relationship with the extreme-rightist party.   
Whereas in the Flemish party system a strong nationalist party as well as a visible extreme-right 
party are present, these are not (viable) options in Wallonia, and this has consequences for how voters 
with an anti-immigrant disposition behave. In Wallonia, these voters seem to end up with the liberal 
party (MR), still to the right of the political spectrum. Interestingly, the liberal party in Flanders (that 
originated from the same traditional national Liberal party as the MR) does not attract these prejudiced 
voters. This creates an interesting paradox for both liberal parties: They attract prejudiced voters in 
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Wallonia – as they are the only main democratic alternative to the right – while they do not attract 
these voters in Flanders, probably because of the existence of the Flemish-nationalist party. The 
supply side seems to be of a crucial importance in this respect. Prejudiced voters prefer the option 
that is situated most to the right, implying that when there are few viable options at this side of the 
political spectrum, the most right-wing option might just as well be a center party. We should note 
that there is no immediate reason to assume why a well-organized far-right party in Wallonia could 
not attract these prejudiced voters (as it did in Flanders). Looking at the trends in the saliency of 
immigration issues, and the overall scores on anti-immigrant prejudice, Flanders and Wallonia are 
very comparable. The main difference between both regions should thus mainly be identified at the 
supply side, and not at the demand side of the voters’ preferences.  
Additionally, our results indicate important differences in the salience of anti-regional prejudice 
in both party systems. Whereas this attitude seems to divide the electorate in Flanders to some extent, 
it has no predictive power in explaining voting propensities in Wallonia, once the generalized 
prejudice component is taken into account. Feelings toward immigrants, on the other hand, seem to 
be an important determinant of intended political behavior in both regions, even more so in Wallonia, 
so that H3 and H5 are only partly confirmed. These feelings explain preferences on the left-hand side 
(positive feelings) and on the right-hand side (negative feelings). Once more, differences in the 
supply-side seem the most obvious explanation for this difference. As there is no viable nationalist 
party in Wallonia, anti-regional prejudice can simply not be translated in a particular type of political 
behavior. 
A first limitation of the study is the fact that we could not control for additional important factors 
situated in the field of personality psychology (such as SDO and RWA) and sociology (such as 
neighborhood characteristics). These factors are important covariates of generalized prejudice and its 
translation to political behavior (Rink, Phalet, & Swyngedouw, 2009). Similarly, we did not have 
appropriate measures for ingroup attitudes, which could potentially have affected party preferences 
as well. Especially with regard to extreme-right voting not including ingroup evaluations might bias 
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the strength of the prejudice relations. Nevertheless, research has shown that outgroup attitudes are 
still a more powerful predictor of extreme-right voting than ingroup feelings (Billiet & De Witte, 
1995; Meuleman & Lubbers, 2013).  In an additional analysis we have included attitudes toward the 
own regional group as proxy measure for ingroup attitudes in the analyses. The results show that the 
effect sizes of the prejudice indicators were hardly affected. It must be noted, however, that for a fair 
number of respondents, the own regional group is probably not the group they identify with most, and 
therefore, our proxy is not a good ingroup indicator. Second, we did not have data on the Brussels 
Capital region, which would have given important additional insights in the structure of prejudice and 
party preferences. In this region, Dutch- and French-speaking citizens live together, which probably 
affects how they think about each other. Furthermore, in Brussels there is a viable regionalist party, 
DéFi, propagating a strong Walloon identity. In other words, in Brussels Capital there is a supply-
side for the expression of anti-Flemish attitudes. In future research, it would be interesting to 
investigate this region as well.  
To conclude, prejudices are clearly interrelated, but not perfectly. Observed prejudices have a clear 
target-specific component and have different political consequences. Accordingly, target-specific 
prejudices cannot simply be reduced to a prejudiced personality and must be studied within the 
particular intergroup context that surrounds its development. The structure of prejudice is, however, 
not context-specific, at least in Belgium. The different evolutions and experiences in Flanders and 
Wallonia with regard to the history of immigration, the linguistic and autonomy conflict, the separate 
party system, and political discourse have activated different social norms with regard to prejudice 
expressions, but these social norms clearly did not influence how particular prejudices are interrelated. 
Walloons and Flemings organize their thinking about outgroups in a similar way. The intergroup 
context, however, does play an important moderating role in the translation of prejudices to party 
preferences. There is a clear asymmetry between both regions: While anti-immigrant prejudice 
defines party choice in Flanders and Wallonia, regional prejudice is only relevant for intended 
political behavior in Flanders. These relationships were group-specific and could not be explained by 
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a generalized prejudice personality. The regional context in Belgium thus matters for the political 
consequences of prejudice, but not for its structure. 
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Figure 1 – Theoretical model and research questions 
 
 
Intergroup context: Flanders versus Wallonia 
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Figure 2 – Positive feelings toward different target groups by regional group 
Note. Bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3 – Generalized prejudice structure in Belgium, Flanders, and Wallonia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Figure represents Model 1b for Belgium and the Configural Invariance Model 4 for Flanders and Wallonia in Appendix A.   
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Figure 4 – Propensity to vote by regional group 
 
Note. Bars are 95% confidence intervals and can be compared within regions 
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Figure 5 – Effect size of relation between target-specific negative feelings and PTVs 
Flanders
 
Wallonia 
 
Note. Effect sizes based on multivariate regression model, controlling for generalized prejudice, age, gender, 
education, religious practice and SES. Full models in Appendix B. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 1 – Correlations between target-specific positive feelings by regional group 
(Above diagonal = Walloons; Below diagonal = Flemings) 
Positive feelings 
toward… 
Other regional 
group 
Immigrants Homosexuals Jews 
Other regional group − .352 .399 .469 
Immigrants .546 − .295 .423 
Homosexuals .459 .364 − .610 
Jews .483 .469 .499 − 
Note. All correlations are significant p < .001. Correlations in bold are significantly different between the two 
regional groups. 
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Appendix A − Multigroup confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of prejudice  
 
X² (df) 
Model 
comparison 
∆ X² 
p-value 
RMSEA CFI TLI 
One-group Belgians (N = 1392)       
(1a) One-factor GP 25.176 (2)   .091 .969 .906 
(1b) One-factor GP + res. cov. immigrant & other regional 
group 
3.135 (1) 1a versus 1b < .001 .039 .997 .983 
One-group Flemings (N = 768)       
(2a) One-factor GP 16.270 (2)   .096 .966 .898 
(2b) One-factor GP + res. cov. immigrant & other regional 
group  
3.848 (1) 2a versus 2b .007 .061 .993 .959 
One-group Walloons (N = 624)       
(3a) One-factor GP  8.366 (2)   .071 .981 .944 
(3b) One-factor GP + res. cov. immigrant & other regional 
group 
2.097 (1) 3a versus 3b .040 .042 .997 .981 
Two-group Flemings versus Walloons       
(4) Configural Invariance  5.977 (2)   .053 .995 .969 
(5) Equal factor loadings 18.199 (5) 4 versus 5 .029 .062 .983 .959 
(6) Equal factor loadings + equal res. cov 22.234 (6) 5 versus 6 .099 .062 .979 .958 
(7a) Equal intercepts + equal factor loadings + equal res. cov 65.933 (9) 6 versus 7a < .001 .095 .926 .901 
(7b) Model 7a + free intercept homosexuals 37.366 (8) 6 versus 7b < .001 .073 .962 .942 
(7c) Model 7b + free intercept immigrants 23.659 (7) 6 versus 7c .238 .058 .978 .963 
Note. Results of multigroup analysis via MLR estimation. Res. cov. = Residual covariance; GP = Generalized prejudice.
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Appendix B – Standardized multivariate regressions of structure of prejudice and party preference  
FLANDERS Far-left Greens Socialists Christian-Democrats Liberal Flemish-Nationalist Extreme-right 
Negative feelings toward 
immigrants 
−.141*** −.095 −.331*** −.253*** −.198*** −.100 −.193*** −.152* −.098* −.031 .116** .186** .368*** .368*** 
Generalized prejudice  −.006  −.114  −.141  −.058  −.097  −.104  −.034 
Gender (ref. male) .054 .049 .101** .092** .089* .077* −.046 −.050 .007 .000 −.084* −.092* −.057 −.057 
Age −.080 −.084 −.032 −.040 −.074 −.083 −.023 −.027 −.077 −.084 −.037 −.044 −.253*** −.253*** 
Education −.103* −.105* .146*** .142*** −.045 −.051 .041 .038 .144*** .140*** .051 .048 −.128** −.128** 
SES (ref. manual worker)               
Self-employed −.024 −.021 −.012 −.007 −.086 −.080 .006 .008 .224*** .227*** .039 .042 −.077 −.077 
Non-Manual worker .091 .090 .165** .163** .076 .074 .041 .040 .126 .124 −.003 −.007 −.143* −.143* 
Non-active .028 .030 .098 .103 .046 .051 .065 .066 .095 .098 .046 .049 −.022 −.021 
Religious practice (ref. 
Catholic non-practicing) 
              
Non-religious .152*** .153*** .068 .070 .135*** .137*** −.324*** −.323*** −.110** −.109** −.105** −.104** −.068* −.069* 
Catholic practicing −.016 −.012 .062 .069 −.051 −.042 .212*** .217*** −.067 −.060 −.097* −.090* −.059 −.059 
Other .120** .123** .090** .095*** .117*** .124*** −.070* −.067* −.013 −.009 −.150*** −.146*** −.061* −.061* 
R² .081 .084 .186 .190 .110 .118 .214 .217 .098 .102 .056 .062 .186 .187 
 Far−left Greens Socialists Christian-Democrats Liberal Flemish-Nationalist Extreme-right 
Negative feelings toward 
regional Other 
−.114** −.014 −.261*** −.055 −.224*** −.191** −.197*** −.183** −.123** −.107 .116** .230** .196*** −.062 
Generalized prejudice  −.137  −.282***  −.044  −.019  −.021  −.157  .352*** 
Gender (ref. male) .045 .043 .080* .075* .069 .068 −.063 −.063 −.004 −.004 −.075* −.078* −.043 −.035 
Age −.101* −.093 −.082 −.066 −.110* −.108* −.057 −.057 −.098 −.097 −.018 −.008 −.206*** −.226*** 
Education −.095* −.101* .163*** .152*** −.046 −.049 .042 .041 .139*** .138*** .047 .042 −.160*** −.146*** 
SES (ref. manual worker)               
Self-employed −.012 −.014 .014 .011 −.074 −.075 .018 .018 .228*** .228*** .031 .029 −.113* −.108* 
Non-Manual worker .105 .096 .199*** .181*** .086 .083 .057 .055 .131* .129* −.010 −.022 −.191* −.167* 
Non-active .046 .040 .141* .129* .065 .063 .088 .086 .104 .103 .031 .027 −.075 −.061 
Religious practice (ref. 
Catholic non-practicing) 
              
Non-religious .161*** .156** .089* .080* .148*** .146*** −.311*** −.312*** −.104** −.104** −.113** −.117** −.094** −.081* 
Catholic practicing −.004 −.005 .089* .088* −.032 −.032 .231*** .231*** −.056 −.056 −.107* −.107* −.085* −.086* 
Other .125** .128** .101*** .110*** .121*** .122*** −.065* −.065* −.012 −.012 −.154*** −.150*** −.081* −.089** 
R² .080 .086 .168 .191 .126 .126 .212 .212 .105 .105 .057 .067 .118 .171 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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WALLONIA Far-Left Greens Socialists Christian-Democrats Liberal Regionalists Extreme-right 
Negative feelings toward 
immigrants 
−.108* −.157** −.307*** −.320*** −.340*** −.330*** −.170*** −.189*** .174*** .180*** .062 .058 .368*** .387*** 
Generalized prejudice  .079  .009  −.016  .060  −.050  .013  −.076 
Gender (ref. male) −.006 −.011 .066 .056 .046 .058 −.087 −.060 −.021 −.027 −.095* −.086* −.057 −.072 
Age −.186*** −.187*** −.135* −.115* .047 .053 −.050 −.034 −.028 −.003 −.085 −.072 −.167*** −.167*** 
Education −.041 −.060 .197*** .197*** −.065 −.082 .154*** .167*** .209*** .203*** .105 .122* .023 −.009 
SES (ref. manual worker)               
Self-employed −.149** −.110* −.042 −.045 −.086 −.059 .048 .053 .166** .135** .045 .044 −.025 −.017 
Non-Manual worker −.217** −.148 .037 .063 −.033 .019 .101 .111 .102 .079 .091 .065 −.112 −.126 
Non-active −.025 .012 .131* .135* .025 .043 .093 .090 .043 .022 .103 .083 −.107 −.116 
Religious practice (ref. 
Catholic non-practicing) 
              
Non-religious .091* .099* −.021 −.018 −.023 −.011 −.301*** −.291*** −.111* −.132** −.109* −.104* −.031 −.019 
Catholic practicing −.008 −.007 .029 .043 −.118** −.109* .145** .177*** .106* .084 .054 .040 −.061 −.049 
Other .068 .061 −.015 −.026 −.015 −.032 −.052 −.052 −.105** −.115*** −.049 −.052 −.035 −.031 
R² .087 .083 .206 .170 .122 .148 .196 .199 .124 .134 .044 .047 .176 .178 
 Far-Left Greens Socialists Christian-Democrats Liberal Regionalists Extreme-right 
Negative feelings toward 
regional Other 
−.014 −.008 −.053 .062 −.095* .031 .005 .044 −.042 −.115 .031 .009 −.034 −.179** 
Generalized prejudice  −.012  −.234**  −.240**  −.086  .134  .047  .280*** 
Gender (ref. male) .005 −.015 .074 .040 .062 .047 −.088* −.069 −.024 −.012 −.098* −.085* −.070 −.045 
Age −.180*** −.179*** −.137** −.084 .039 .082 −.053 −.015 −.011 −.031 −.077 −.075 −.176*** −.214*** 
Education −.004 −.034 .282*** .248*** .019 −.024 .209*** .198*** .153*** .172*** .097 .114* −.103* −.074 
SES (ref. manual worker)               
Self-employed −.155** −.124* −.059 −.075 −.097 −.088 .042 .036 .190*** .153** .053 .049 .003 .021 
Non-Manual worker −.221** −.165* .025 .026 −.014 −.016 .098 .089 .129 .097 .105 .071 −.093 −.083 
Non-active −.026 .001 .115 .106 .021 .017 .093 .073 .068 .037 .118 .088 −.081 −.078 
Religious practice (ref. 
Catholic non-practicing) 
              
Non-religious .099* .108* .008 −.003 .003 .004 −.290*** −.281*** −.126** −.139*** −.121** −.106* −.061 −.036 
Catholic practicing −.006 .005 .056 .063 −.106* −.083 .169*** .189*** .091 .071 .046 .037 −.090** −.073* 
Other .077 .073 .013 −.001 .015 −.005 −.037 −.037 −.117*** −.129*** −.055 −.056 −.066 −.061 
R² .075 .065 .124 .126 .032 .076 .174 .184 .108 .117 .044 .044 .059 .120 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Appendix C – Standardized univariate regressions of structure of prejudice and party preference controlled for 
average PTV score 
FLANDERS Far-Left Greens Socialists 
Christian-
Democrats 
Liberals 
Flemish-
nationalists 
Extreme-right 
Negative feelings toward 
immigrants 
−.076 −.215*** −.075 −.130* −.009 .166*** .343*** 
Generalized prejudice .028 −.017 −.040 .002 .000 −.014 .030 
PTV mean .610*** .619*** .569*** .438*** .438*** .438*** .356*** 
Negative feelings toward regional 
Other 
.041 −.007 −.134* −.134* −.058 .281*** −.022 
Generalized prejudice −.077 −.198** .022 .016 .047 −.140** .358*** 
PTV mean .611*** .619*** .565*** .437*** .539*** .445*** .359*** 
WALLONIA Far-Left Greens Socialists 
Christian-
Democrats 
Liberals  Regionalists Extreme-right 
Negative feelings toward 
immigrants 
−.088* −.231*** −.269*** −.115** .239*** .130** .414*** 
Generalized prejudice .072 .009 −.021 .051 −.060 .008  −.065 
PTV mean .562*** .656*** .513*** .637*** .435*** .661*** .427*** 
Negative feelings toward regional 
Other 
−.002 .077 .020 .052 −.073 .050 −.138* 
Generalized prejudice .022 −.176*** −.186** −.048 .121* .050 .274*** 
PTV mean .568*** .671*** .530*** .642*** .411*** .656*** .389*** 
Note. PTV mean is calculated as the mean across all PTVs for each party per region. Following control variables were included: gender, age, education, SES, and religious 
practice. Contrary to the results in Appendix B, the entries are based on univariate regression results per political party. This was necessary to avoid perfect linearity between 
the PTV mean score and the dependent variables. As a consequence, these results are not directly comparable with the multivariate results in Appendix B. * p < .05, ** p < 
.01, *** p < .001  
 
